Hofstra Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 1

Article 1

1984

Introduction
Daniel L. Goelzer

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Goelzer, Daniel L. (1984) "Introduction," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 13: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol13/iss1/1

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Goelzer: Introduction
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Fall 1984

SYMPOSIUM ON INSIDER TRADING

INTRODUCTION*
Daniel L. Goelzer**

In recent years, the Securities and Exchange Commission's increased enforcement presence with respect to insider trading has

prompted a growing body of legal and public commentary. It is important to keep in mind, however, that concern about the occurrence

and consequences of insider trading is by no means a recent phenomenon. Indeed, the elimination of insider trading abuses was one of
the goals of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1

Much of the recent commentary on insider trading has centered
on the type of conduct that the law should proscribe. The federal

securities laws do not contain an express definition of insider trading.
Instead, liability for insider trading has grown out of the antifraud

provisions of these statutes. The articulation of the scope of the pro* Copyright 1985 by Daniel L. Goelzer.
** General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission.

The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions made to this Article by Diane
Sanger, Assistant General Counsel, Alan B. Cohen, Special Counsel, and Ivette Lopez, Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission.
As a matter of policy, the Securities and Exchange Commission disclaims responsibility
for any private publication or statement of any of its employees. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission or its
staff. See 17 C.F.R. 200.735-4(e)(2)(ii).
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1984). The Senate Banking and Currency Committee referred to
insider trading as "fa]mong the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings." S. REP. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
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hibition has evolved through case-by-case adjudication, consistent
with the purposes of the securities laws and in recognition of established principles of common law. Existing law strikes an appropriate
balance in prohibiting the abuse of confidential information without
detracting from the benefits to the markets resulting from individual
initiative in ferreting out and analyzing information.
Concern about insider trading has come into sharp focus in recent years as a result of the increasing size and number of mergers
and tender offers, and the expansion of trading in standardized options. Persons with advance knowledge of a merger or tender offer
announcement have an opportunity to profit substantially in a short
period of time with little risk of loss. Such opportunities for illegal
profits can be greatly maximized in the options market because the
value of an option contract after the announcement of a significant
event, such as a proposed merger, tends to increase by a much
greater percentage than does the value of the underlying stock. The
effect of these developments on the liquidity, efficiency and fairness
of capital markets was an important factor in the Commission's recommendation, and Congress' adoption, of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) 2 as a means of increasing the risks of, and
therefore deterring, insider trading.
Some commentators have challenged the predicates for this concern and, most particularly, have disputed that individual investors
are actually harmed by insider trading. 3 But public reaction to press
accounts of insider trading suggests that individual investors do not
share this perception. Congress and the courts, too, have taken a
contrary view. Moreover, other substantial policy concerns support
the prohibition of insider trading. One fundamental and widely recognized basis for the prohibition is the fear that insider trading
threatens to erode the critical role of public investors and market
professionals in the nation's economy. Capital formation and national economic growth are dependent on liquid, efficient and fair
markets. These conditions, in turn, depend upon investor confidence
in the fairness and integrity of the capital markets. Insider trading
2. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified in
scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (Supp. 1984)).

3. See, e.g., H.

MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET

(1966); Carlton &

Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 857 (1983); Fischel, Insider
Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks v. SEC, 13 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 127 (1984); Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against
Insider Trading, 13 HOESTRA L. REV. 9 (1984).
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threatens these markets by undermining the expectations of fairness
and honesty that are the foundation of public confidence. Public investors may be less willing to place their money at risk in securities
if they believe that persons in possession of confidential information
will take unfair advantage of them. Insider trading also threatens the
orderliness and stability of the markets by exposing market professionals to substantial losses and potential insolvency. Market specialists, for example, obligated to maintain a fair and orderly market,
may be unable to make rational pricing or investment decisions in
the face of insider trading.
Congress has provided the Commission with a variety of tools to
carry out its enforcement responsibilities. Insider traders can be enjoined, required to disgorge profits, and subjected to other appropriate ancillary sanctions.4 In addition, the ITSA authorizes the Commission to seek a civil penalty of up to three times the amount of
profit gained or loss avoided; 5 the Act also prevents circumvention of
existing prohibitions by explicitly making it illegal to trade in derivative securities such as options while in possession of nonpublic material information.6 These provisions will prove to be strong deterrents
to insider trading, but deterrence can be further strengthened with
increased attention to private policing mechanisms.
The private sector can and should contribute to the deterrence
of insider trading by adopting procedures to make employees aware
of their organization's policies in this area. Issues such as who should
have access to confidential information, how to protect against improper use or disclosure of such information, and when to do so, are
questions that must be resolved within the organizational structure
and procedures of individual private entities.
Corporations, law firms, brokerage houses, investment bankers
and others who are involved in the securities business, or who otherwise have access to confidential information, should desire and indeed may be obligated by business commitments to protect confidential information disclosed to them during the normal course of
business. Those who possess confidential information that may affect
the securities markets have an affirmative obligation to safeguard
such information.
Other compelling reasons support the adoption of appropriate
procedures to prevent employee misuse of confidential material.
4. See H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 6-8 (1983).
5.
6.

15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(2)(A) (Supp. 1985).
15 U.S.C.A. § 78r (Supp. 1984).
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Since clients generally expect their information to be handled with
the strictest confidentiality, implementing appropriate procedures
will reassure the client and enhance the organization's reputation.
Because efforts to complete a transaction may be frustrated by the
premature disclosure of nonpublic information, firms have an added
incentive to safeguard such information.
While appropriate procedures will depend upon such factors as
the nature of the business, the organization's structure, and other
factors unique to a particular entity, several general categories of
procedures can be identified. An organization can adopt educational
procedures aimed at informing employees about its policy regarding
the use of confidential information. A manual explaining that policy
and describing the firm's rules regarding securities transactions
should be distributed to all employees; a signed statement from all
employees to the effect that the manual was received, read and understood could be required to stress the importance of the policy and
rules. An explanation of the legal consequences of insider trading
and illustrations of what constitutes the prohibited conduct should be
included in the manual. Furthermore, someone should be appointed
to provide further guidance as needed, and that person's availability
should be publicized.
In addition, organizations can adopt procedures aimed at protecting information from inadvertent or premature disclosure. Such
safeguarding procedures could include disclosing information only on
a need-to-know basis; using code names, numbers or decoys; storing
information in restricted files; and shredding documents that are no
longer needed. In the case of an issuer, requests for information
should be handled by a designated person who is responsible for disclosing appropriate information. Numbering both original documents
and copies and requiring employees to sign for them is one tool that
would better control disclosure of highly sensitive information.
In multi-service organizations, transfers of personnel between
departments and communication between departments should be
monitored to prevent potential conflicts of interest. The effectiveness
of these and similar procedures should be tested, perhaps by planting
phony information to discover leaks in the system.
Organizations also can impose reporting requirements aimed at
identifying potential problems or apparent conflicts of interests. New
employees could be asked to report securities ownership, including
that of close family members, and periodic updates of changes in
ownership could be required. An alternative approach would require
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post-transaction notification within specified periods of time.
Finally, organizations may choose to restrict or prohibit trading
activity by employees. Trading could be restricted to transactions
completed through mutual funds or blind trusts. A total trading prohibition with respect to a corporation's own stock or that of its clients also might be imposed. Such a prohibition could be permanent
or temporary, as required by the circumstances. Short-sales and options transactions in the securities of the organization or those of its
clients could be prohibited. Another approach would be to require
written permission from designated persons before transactions are
completed. Such clearance procedures could allow for specified periods during which employees would not be allowed to trade if the
organization is in possession of material nonpublic information.
While such protections, consistently and firmly enforced, are
likely to deter insider trading, debate will continue regarding the legal parameters of insider trading and the limits of the conduct to be
proscribed. This Symposium issue of the Hofstra Law Review addresses these issues.
The first Article, by Jonathan R. Macey, traces the intellectual
history of Rule 1Ob-5 and concludes that the Supreme Court, in
Chiarellav. United States and Dirks v. SEC, grounded tippee liability "on a theory that recognizes the value to society of protecting
property rights in inside information." The Supreme Court's test
falls short, the author argues, because it does not provide a standard
for determining when one has a legally recognized property right in
information, and fails to provide damages to the party actually injured by information misappropriation. Discussing the economic
function of property rights in information, Professor Macey suggests
that a better approach would protect information that is the "proper
subject of contract." 8 Under this test, liability would accrue for misappropriation of such information through trading or disclosure. Professor Macey proposes that the owners of the information be given
standing to sue, and that the measure of damages be determined by
the harm caused to the owner.
Richard M. Phillips and Robert J. Zutz begin their Article by
reviewing the historical standards for tippee liability under Rule
lOb-5, criticizing what the authors view as the Supreme Court's re7. Macey, From Fairnessto Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider
Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 36 (1984).
8. Id. at 39.
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turn to the "fiduciary duty" standard of liability.9 The authors argue
that the misappropriation theory of liability, the theory of "constructive insiders," and Rule 14e-3 are all insufficient to close the gaps
created by the Dirks decision. Instead, they propose a new statutory
foundation, building liability upon "trading in securities based upon
unfair informational advantages." 10 The proposed standard would require possession of material, non-public information and evidence
that the trader acquired such information through the use of business, personal or other special relationships not available to the
public.
Barbara Aldave, too, criticizes the Chiarella/Dirksapproach,
finding fault with the Supreme Court's "expansive view of what constitutes a fiduciary relationship." 11 A more realistic approach, she
argues, is the misappropriation theory, which focuses on the misappropriator's actual obligation to the person who entrusted information to him, rather than on his fictional relationship. to the parties
with whom he trades. Professor Aldave proposes that instead of
grounding liability on the fiduciary relationship between trading parties, liability should be conditioned on "a party's deception of those
who have given him privileged access to confidential information."',
She concludes her Article with the suggestion that SEC sanctions be
employed to deter Rule lOb-5 violations, since the difficulties of
identifying and compensating injured parties in an impersonal market militate against any private right of action.
An essay by Daniel R. Fischel rounds out the Symposium with
an economic analysis of the Dirks decision.13 Professor Fischel argues that insider trading may benefit rather than harm investors,
and that investment analysts in particular serve an important social
function by reducing the problem of asymmetric information in the
purchase and sale of securities. As a result, this author concludes,
the law "should not equate the existence of fiduciary duties with a
prohibition against insider trading,"' 4 and investment analysts
"should be free of legal rules restricting the use of inside
9. Phillips & Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need for Legislative Repair, 13
HOFSTRA L. REv. 65, 78 (1984).

10. Id. at 99.
11. Aldave, Misappropriation:A General Theory of Liabilityfor Trading on Nonpublic
Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 101, 107 (1984).

12. Id. at 124.
13. Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks
v. SEC, 13 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 127 (1984).
14. Id. at 129.
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information.' 15
These Articles raise provocative questions about the prosecution
of insider trading. While I do not agree with all that is said,16 I
believe that the evolution of the law will be influenced by these wellreasoned commentaries.

15.

Id. at 130.

16. Despite the criticisms several of the authors level at the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Dirks and Chiarella,it is difficult to dispute that the Commission's enforcement program
has continued to fair well since those decisions. See, e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2112 (1985).
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